PUBWCATIOffS  OF 

Th«  Amertcah  ACAJDiaarsf  op  Powticai:*  and  Sociai,  SciEiica, 

No.  141. 


lesaed  Fortsigflitlv. 


Febraary  26^  1895. 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials  ? 


BV 


J    G.  BOURINOT,  CM. a,  LLD.,  DX.L,  Lit  D. 


ji  PAPER  SUBMITTED  TO  THE 
AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  FOLITiCAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE 


PHILADELPHIA : 
AMEJRXCAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIKKC*. 


SusiLAJto  I    P.  S.  King  at  Soc,  m  and  14  King  St.,  WestrauisWr,  Londoo,  S.  W, 
Fram CK  ^  L.  I^onKc,  ntc  S^M^ot  sa,  Paris.    GsKMUunr :  Gustav  RssUer,  Jrwu 
iXAi,« :  Dii%r'^e  d«i Gwmale  dcgU  Ecc4i<«ilstl,  Reos*, ^a  R.,pct»  sen,  - 


RS, 


AtV4,  i{5  e€%ii. 


Annmai  SiibscrtfiWH,  $6,m 


^ 


The  following  papers  which  are  of  interest  to 


Students  of  Political  Sci 


V^"' 


have  appeared  in  the  Annals  and  been 


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SEPARATE  EDITIONS: 


■  'i 


Nature  of  the  Federal  State. 

By  E.  V.  Robinson. 


Price,  35  Cents. 


^''  ^men?""'''  °^  '"^^  °"^"  ^"^  ^^"^'^  <>'  Govern- 

By  F.  I.  HEPR.OTT,  Ph.  D.  »„,.    ,     ^ 

Krice,  35  Cent*. 

Sidgwick^s  Elements  of  Politics. 

By  Prof.  Jas.  HarveY  .ROBINSON. 


Place  of  Party  in  the  Political  System. 

-^y  Prof.  ANSON  D.  MORSE. 

Political  Science  at  Oxford. 

By  a  G.  Ritchie. 
Law  of  Nature. 

By  Prof,  F    M    TAYLOR. 

On  the  Conception  of  Sovereignty. 

By  D.  G.  Ritchie. 

Farty  Government. 

By  Chas.  Richardson. 


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AlDencftD  Acadsm?  of  PnmiMi  anA  p«.:.i  «-*  ^ 

STATION  B,  PMILAOetPMIA.  U.  S.  A. 


ELECTED  OR  APPOINTED  OFFICIALS? 


A  CANADIAN  QUESTION. 


I. 

The  subject  to  which  I  am  about  to  direct  the  attention  of 
the  members  o^  the  Academy  is  not  simply  a  question  in 
which  the  Canadian  people  alone  have  a  deep  intercut.  On 
the  contrar>^  I  think  I  shall  be  able  to  show,  before  I  have 
concluded  my  argument,  that  it  necessarily  brings  up  con- 
siderations affecting  the  political  system  of  the  United  States, 
and  is  consequently  of  much  importance  to  all  who  are  in- 
terested in  the  problems  of  government,  federal,  state  and 
municipal,  on  this  continent,  and  are  endeavoring,  with 
patriotic  zeal,  to  reach  a  solution  that  will  remove  many 
difficulties  and  evils  that  are  now  deeply  injurious  to  the 
working  of  democratic  institutions. 

Some  months  ago  the  government  of  the  Province  of  On- 
tario, which  comprises  nearly  one-half  of  the  total  population 
of  the  Dominion,  and  is  in  ever^^  way  the  most  wealthy  and 
influential  section  of  the  federation,  appointed  an  important 
commission,  composed  of  one  of  the  ablest  judges  of  the 
Canadian  bench,   Mr.    Chancellor  Eoyd,  of  the  Honorable 

[653] 


2  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

John  Beverly  Robinson,  late  lieutenant-governor,  and  of  three 
other  gentlemen  of  less  national  repute,  but  chosen  from  their 
knowledge  of  county  and  municipal  affairs.  The  object  of 
this  commission  is  to  consider  the  best  mode  of  appoint- 
ing and  paying  a  certain  class  of  provincial  officials.  Its 
significance  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  indicates  the  existence 
of  a  disturbing  element  in  the  province,  having  in  contempla- 
tion a  change  in  the  present  mode  of  nominating  and 
appointing  public  officers  by  the  crown  or  lieutenant-gov- 
ernor on  the  advice  of  his  constitutional  council;  that  is  to 
say,  by  the  cabinet  or  ministry,  w^ho  are  responsible  at  once 
to  the  crown  and  to  the  legislative  assembly  in  which  they 
have  seats,  and  by  w^hose  support  only  they  can  retain  office. 
An  agitation  has  been  commenced  which  has,  happily,  not 
extended  beyond  a  ver>^  limited  area  of  influence  in  this  one 
province,  to  make  certain  appointments  elective,  as  in  the 
United  States,  or  else  give  them  to  the  municipal  councils  of 
the  counties.  This  agitation  has  obtained  a  slight  headway 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  fostered  by  a  few  politicians  who  have 
either  not  given  the  subject  the  least  reflection,  or  felt  they 
can  gain  an  evanescent  political  advantage  by  concurring  in 
the  opinions  that  appear  to  be  entertained  in  some  rural  con- 
stituencies where  sound  principles  of  political  science  are  not 
well  understood,  or  w^here  the  hope  of  obtaining  control  of  a 
few  important  public  offices  has  outv^reiglied  those  consider- 
ations of  sound  public  policy  and  public  interest  which  lie  at 
the  foundation  of  the  present  S3^stem  of  appointments.  Al- 
though, as  I  have  already  said,  the  movement  is  not  sup- 
ported by  any  large  section  of  people — indeed,  the  inquiry 
before  the  commissioners  fully  proves  that  fact — still  the 
existence  of  the  commission  gives  a  positive  gravity  to  the 
subject  w^hich  otherwise,  possibly,  it  w^ould  not  have,  and 
renders  it  necessary  that  all  those  who  value  the  welfare  of 
the  communit3^ — for  its  w^elfare  is  obviously  involved  in  its 
conditions  of  government — should  seriously  consider  the 
matter  in  all  its  bearings  with  the  view  of  informing  the 

[654] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  3 

public  mind  in  case  it  has  doubts,  and  of  leading  it  from  any 
fallacious  conclusions  to  which  a  few  thoughtless  persons 
have  been  attempting  from  time  to  time  of  late  to  lead  public 
opinion  in  a  province  whose  action  on  political  or  other  ques- 
tions naturally  attracts  much  attention  throughout  the  Do- 
minion. 

II. 

In  order  that  all  the  issues  involved  in  the  inquir>'  before 
the  commission  may  be  thoroughly  understood  it  is  necessary 
that  I  should  at  the  outset  make  some  explanations  with  re- 
spect to  the  present  system  of  appointing  and  paying  officials, 
and  in  doing  so  I  may  state  that  the  one  which  obtains  in 
Ontario,  is  that  of  all  the  other  provinces  of  Canada — in 
fact,  the  system  which  has  come  from  England  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  parliamentar\^  or  responsible  govern- 
ment, and  prevails  from  one  end  of  the  Dominion  to  the  other, 
including  the  Northwest  territories.  At  the  present  time 
there  are  in  the  Province  of  Ontario  the  following  function- 
aries and  officials,  legislative,  executive,  administrative  and 
judicial,  who  legislate,  expound  the  law,  and  administer  the 
affairs  of  the  province  generally,  in  accordance  with  the 
British  North  America  Act  of  1867,  which  is  the  funda- 
mental law  which  regulates  the  jurisdiction  of  each  province 
within  its  territorial  and  legal  limits: 

I.  The  Exeaitive  Departmeiit :  A  lieutenant-governor, 
appointed  practically  for  five  years,  and  removable  for 
cause  by  the  governor-general  in  council — that  is,  by  the 
government  of  the  Dominion. 

An  executive  or  advisor\^  council,  composed  of  the  follow- 
ing ministers,  called  to  office  by  the  lieutenant-governor, 
having  seats  in  an  assembly,  elected  by  the  people,  and 
holding  office  only  as  long  as  they  retain  the  confidence  of 
the  majority  of  that  house:  an  attorney- general,  generally 
the  prime  minister,  as  at  present;  a  commissioner  of  crown 
lands,  a  commissioner  of  public  works,  a  provincial  secre- 
tary,   a  provincial  treasurer,   a   minister  of   education,    a 

[655] 


4  ANNAI.S  OF  THE   AMERICAN   ACADEMY. 

minister  of  agriculture,  and  sometimes,  as  now,  one  or  more 
executive  councilors  without  a  departmental  office. 

Under  these  several  executive  and  administrative  political 
heads  there  is  a  large  permanent  body  of  public  officials, 
consisting  of  deputy  ministers,  secretaries  and  clerks,  who 
perform  all  the  duties  that  devolve  on  the  several  depart- 
ments in  accordance  with  law  and  custom.  The  officers  and 
clerks  come  under  statutes  regulating  appointments  and 
promotions.  Every  candidate  for  a  clerkship  at  the  seat  of 
government  enters,  after  an  examination  as  to  qualifications 
and  character,  on  a  probation  of  six  months.  No  appoint- 
ment or  promotion  can  be  made  except  under  the  authority 
of  the  lieutenant-governor  in  council,  upon  the  application 
and  report  of  the  head  of  the  department  in  which  it  is  to 
be  made. 

2.  The  Legislative  Department :  The  lieutenant-governor, 
who  is  not  only  the  executive,  but  the  first  branch  of  the 
legislature*;  a  legislative  assembly,  consisting  of  ninety- 
four  members  elected  by  universal  suffrage  (only  limited 
by  a  short  residence  and  actual  citizenship),  for  a  term  of 
four  years,  unless  sooner  dissolved  by  the  lieutenant-gover- 
nor acting  in  his  executive  capacity.  Attached  to  the  legis- 
lative assembly  are  a  speaker,  elected  by  the  house;  a  clerk, 
a  sergeant-at-arms,  appointed  by  the  lieutenant-governor  in 
council,  and  a  number  of  clerks,  messengers  and  pages 
appointed  by  the  speaker  and  government. 

3.  The  Judicial  Department :  A  supreme  court  of  judica- 
ture, consisting  of  a  court  of  appeal,  composed  of  a  chief 
justice  and  three  justices;  a  high  court  of  justice  in  three 
divisions,  as  follows:  queen's  bench,  with  a  chief  justice  and 
two  justices;  chancery,  with  a  chancellor  and  three  justices; 
common  pleas,  with  a  chief  justice  and  two  justices. 

All  the  foregoing  justices  are  appointed  and  paid  by  the 

•  At  the  present  time,  of  the  seven  provinces  of  the  federation  only  two  have  an 
upper  chamber,  or  legislative  council — Quebec  and  Nova  Scotia.  Ontario  has  bad 
none  since  1867,  when  the  union  was  inaugurated.  The  legislature  of  the  terri- 
tories also  has  only  an  elective  assembly. 

[656] 


Bisected  or  Appointed  Officiai^?  5 

Dominion  government,  and  can  be  removed  only  for  suffi- 
cient cause  by  an  address  to  the  governor-general  from  the 
two  houses  of  the  Dominion  parliament.  In  connection 
with  this  supreme  court  of  judicature  there  are  five  regis- 
trars, ten  clerks,  seven  criers  and  minor  servants,  all  ap- 
pointed by  the  lieutenant-governor  in  council.  Their 
salaries  are,  as  a  rule,  fixed  by  law,  and  all  fees  received  by 
them  are  payable  into  the  public  treasur>'. 

In  addition  to  this  supreme  court,  there  are  the  following 
judicial  officers: 

County  judge — in  the  majority  of  cases,  a  senior  and  a 
junior  in  each  county— appointed,  paid  and  removable  for 
cause  by  the  Dominion  government.  Surrogate  judge, 
whose  duties  are  generally  performed  by  a  county  judge 
under  the  provincial  statute;  master  in  chambers,  master 
in  ordinary,  official  guardian,  inspector  of  local  offices, 
inspector  of  titles,  accountant  of  supreme  court,  inspector 
of  public  offices,  clerk  of  the  process,  clerk  of  assize, 
reporters,  shorthand  writers,  master  of  titles—all  of  whom, 
as  well  as  a  number  of  minor  clerks  and  servants,  are 
appointed  by  the  lieutenant-governor  in  council.  Several  of 
these  offices  may  be  held  by  one  person  at  the  same  time. 

The  civil  service  act,  it  is  necessary  to  mention  here,  can 
be  applied  to  the  master  in  chambers,  master  in  ordinary, 
registrars  of  the  court  of  appeal  and  of  the  several  divisions 
of  the  high  court  of  judicature,  accountant,  surrogate  clerk, 
clerk  of  records  and  writs,  clerk  of  process,  and  clerk  in 
chambers.  The  statute,  however,  leaves  this  within  the 
discretion  of  the  lieutenant-governor  in  council. 

4.  Provincial  Officers  in  Districts :  The  foregoing  officers, 
for  the  most  part,  are  connected  with  the  supreme  court  of 
judicature,  which  reside  at  the  political  and  judicial  capital, 
the  city  of  Toronto.  But  in  order  to  make  this  review  as 
intelligible  and  valuable  as  possible,  I  shall  also  specify  the 
various  officers  and  other  persons  connected  with  the  whole 
public  and  municipal  service,  as  necessarily  involved  in  the 

[657] 


6  Annai^s  of  thk  American  Academy. 

argument  and  in  the  conclusion  to  which  I  wish  to  come. 
In  every  county  of  the  province  there  are,  in  addition  to  the 
county  judges  mentioned  above,  the  following  executive  and 
quasi  judicial  officers:  Sheriff,  local  and  deputy  master, 
deputy  registrar  of  the  high  court  of  justice,  deputy  clerk 
of  the  crown,  clerk  of  county  court,  registrar  of  surrogate 
court,  county  crown  attorney,  clerk  of  the  peace,  coroner,  di- 
vision court  clerk,  division  court  bailiff,  criers  and  constables. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  officials,  we  have  in  the  large 
cities  and  towns  of  the  province  one  hundred  and  twelve 
police  magistrates. 

All  these  officials,  as  enumerated  above,  are  appointed  by 
the  lieutenant-governor  in  council.  Police  magistrates  are 
paid  fixed  salaries,  but  sheriffs,  registrars,  and  other  persons 
in  the  list  receive  fees,  out  of  w^hich  they  pay  their  own 
salaries  and  all  the  expenses  of  their  respective  offices.  In 
the  case  of  registrars  the  salaries  are  regulated  by  statute,  as 
I  shall  show  presently.  Ever>^  officer  receiving  fees  must 
send  a  return  of  the  same  every  year  to  the  proper  authority 
at  Toronto,  and  it  is  published  in  the  official  statement  laid 
before  the  legislature.  The  division  courts,  registry  and 
other  offices  are  regularly  insp-^cted  by  officers  appointed  by 
the  lieutenant-governor  in  council. 

5.  Mimicipal  Coimcih  :  Warden  of  county,  appointed  by 
every  county  council,  from  among  the  reeves  and  deputy 
reeves  that  compose  that  body.  Mayor  of  city  and  town 
elected  by  the  ratepayers  on  a  general  vote.  Reeve  and 
head  of  to^vnship  and  village  councils,  elected,  as  a  rule,  by 
ratepayers  in  such  mimicipalities.  Aldermen  in  cities, 
councilors  in  towns,  villages  and  townships,  elected  by  the 
ratepayers  in  their  respective  municipalities,  to  constitute  the 
councils  thereof.  All  these  municipal  authorities  are  an- 
nually elected  in  the  month  of  January. 

Attached  to  these  several  municipal  corporations  are  the 
following  officers,  appointed  in  all  cases  by  the  councils: 
Clerk,  treasurer,   assessment  commissioner  in   some  cities, 

[658] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officiai^?  j 

city  engineer,  assessors  and  collectors,  auditors,  valuators, 
pound-keepers,  fence- viewers,  overseers  of  highways,  road 
surv^eyors,  road  commissioners,  game  inspectors  and  other 
officials  necessary  for  the  administration  of  municipal  affairs. 
All  important  officers,  like  clerks  and  treasurers,  remain  in 
office  during  good  behavior. 

High  school  trustees  are  appointed  by  the  councils  of  the 
municipalities.  Public  school  trustees  are  elected  by  the 
ratepayers  in  the  several  municipal  divisions.  Inspectors 
of  public  schools  are  appointed  by  county  councils  for  counties, 
and  by  board  of  trustees  for  cities,  from  persons  who  have  a 
regular  certificate  of  qualification  according  to  the  regula- 
tions of  the  educational  department.  Inspectors  of  high, 
normal  and  model  schools  are  appointed  by  the  govern- 
ment. 

6.  Special  Classes  of  Officials :  In  addition  to  the  foregoing 
municipal  officers  there  are  the  following  classes  of  officials  of 
a  special  character,  and  confined  to  a  few  localities:  Chairman 
and  members  of  provincial  board  of  health,  appointed  by  the 
lieutenant-governor  in  council.  Superintendent,  officers  and 
servants  of  reformatories,  by  the  lieutenant-governor  in  coun- 
cil; superintendent  and  bursar  of  insane  asylums,  by  the 
same  authority;  keepers  and  attendants,  by  the  superinten- 
dent; inspectors  of  prisons,  public  charities,  asylums  and 
reformatories,  by  lieutenant-governor  in  council;  keepers  and 
turnkeys  of  county  gaols,  by  sheriff  of  county;  but  the  ap- 
pointments are  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  lieutenant-gov- 
ernor in  council,  and  salaries  are  fixed  by  the  county  coun- 
cils. Constables  in  charge  of  lock-ups  in  municipalities,  by 
the  magistrates  in  courts  of  general  sessions.  High  and 
other  constables,  by  the  general  sessions,  or  county  judge 
or  police  magistrate;  members  of  the  police  force  in  cities 
by  the  board  of  commissioners  composed  by  law  of  the 
county  judge,  police  magistrate  and  the  mayor;  in  munici- 
palities where  no  such  board  exists  the  appointment  of  peace 
officers  rests  with  the  councils. 

[659] 


<  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

III. 
From  the  foregoing  summar>'  of  the  legislative,  adminis- 
trative, judicial  and  municipal  machinery  of  the  province, 
from  the  head  of  the  executive  to  the  crier  or  pound-keeper, 
it  will  be  seen  that  there  are  practically  no  persons  having 
executive  or  ministerial  functions  to  perform — apart,  of 
course,  from  the  political  heads — who  are  elected  by  the 
people.  The  legislative  functions  of  government  are  kept 
distinct  from  the  purely  administrative  and  judicial  depart- 
ments. The  people  legislate  and  govern  through  their 
representative  assemblies,  in  accordance  with  the  wise 
principles  of  English  government.  They  elect  in  the  first 
place  to  the  provincial  legislature  men  to  legislate  for  the 
whole  province;  in  the  next  place,  they  select  councilors, 
mayors  and  reeves,  to  legislate  for  them  in  certain  definite 
municipal  divisions,  on  such  matters  as  local  taxes,  sewage, 
water,  and  other  necessities  and  conveniences  of  life,  as 
provided  and  limited  by  the  law  of  the  general  legislature. 
The  head  of  the  executive  authorit}^  and  also  of  the  legis- 
lative branch  is  the  lieutenant-governor,  who  holds  his  office 
by  virtue  of  the  highest  authority  of  the  Dominion,  and 
quite  independently  of  the  provincial  government.  His 
advisers,  the  executive  council,  are  not  appointed  directly 
by  the  legislature,  to  whom  they  are  responsible,  but  by  the 
lieutenant-governor  whose  choice,  however,  is  limited  by  the 
unwritten  law,  or  the  conventions  and  maxims  of  the  con- 
stitution, to  those  representatives  who  have  the  confidence 
of  the  majority  of  the  people's  house.  All  provincial  or 
public  officials,  apart  from  municipal  officers,  are  appointed 
by  the  lieutenant-governor  on  the  advice  of  his  council. 
The  sheriffs,  registrars,  county  clerks,  and  those  other 
officials  in  counties,  already  enumerated,  are  not  appointed 
or  even  nominated  by  the  councils  of  those  districts,  but  by 
the  Ontario  government,  since  their  duties  are  provincial  in 
their  nature.  The  students  of  English  history  will  remem- 
ber that  the  sheriff  or  shire-reeve  was  one  of  the  most 

[660] 


ElectivD  or  Appointed  Officiai^?  9 

important  judicial  officers  of  early  English  times.  While 
acting  in  a  representative  capacity  he  was  elected  and  pre- 
sided over  the  scirgetnot  or  shire-mote.  But  many  centuries 
have  passed  since  he  was  deprived  of  his  important  functions 
in  the  administration  of  the  king's  justice,  and  became  a 
crown  officer,  performing  important  executive  and  ministerial 
duties  in  connection  with  the  courts.  Such  officers  as 
masters,  county  clerks,  county  attorneys,  and  clerks  of  the 
peace  as  well  as  others,  having  certain  defined  duties  to  dis- 
charge in  the  courts,  are  also  eSvSentially  crown  appoint- 
ments. The  fountain  of  justice  is  the  crown  as  represented 
in  the  courts,  and  it  would  be  an  anomaly  in  the  English  or 
Canadian  system  to  make  such  officers  elective  or  to  hand 
them  to  merely  local  administrative  bodies  of  a  limited 
sphere  of  authority  like  municipal  councils.  Even  in  the 
case  of  the  municipalities  it  has  been  considered  wise  to  limit 
the  privileges  of  the  people,  and  give  their  representatives 
alone  the  right  of  electing  such  officers  as  clerks,  treasurers, 
auditors,  who  have  clerical  and  ministerial  duties  to  perform, 
and  whose  qualifications  can  be  best  tested  and  understood 
by  a  small  body  of  chosen  men.  The  most  important  count}' 
officer,  the  warden,  is  not  elected  by  the  people  generally, 
but  by  a  special  body  of  men,  the  reeves  and  deputy  reeves, 
or  heads  of  councils  of  the  townships  of  the  county  munici- 
pality. The  heads  of  councils  in  cities  and  other  munici- 
palities, into  which  the  county  is  divided,  are  elected 
directly  by  the  ratepayers  of  those  municipal  divisions, — 
a  departure  apparently  from  the  principle  observ^ed  in  the 
case  of  the  warden,  and  other  officers  of  the  municipalities. 
Experience  shows  that  the  election  of  such  heads  of  councils, 
who  are  elected  on  short  terms  of  office,  only  for  one  year  in 
all  cases,  and  may  have  no  experience  whatever  of  municipal 
work,  does  not  work  very  satisfactorily  in  cities,  where 
knowledge  and  experience,  longer  tenure  of  office,  and 
larger  control  over  work  of  administration  are  so  very 
desirable. 

[661] 


lo  Annai^  of  the  American  Academy. 

Before  I  continue  this  argument  it  is  interesting  to  com- 
pare the  foregoing  list  of  persons  engaged  in  Ontario  in 
legislative,  administrative,  judicial  and  municipal  work, 
with  similar  classes  in  the  great  State  of  Ohio,  whose  natural 
resources,  population,  educational  and  political  progress  and 
wealth  naturally  lead  one  to  make  comparisons  with  the 
Canadian  province. 

At  the  present  time  citizens  in  Ohio  vote  for  the  following 
classes  of  officers  and  representatives:  * 

1.  Federal  Officers:  Electors  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  once  in  every  four  years.  Members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  United  States,  once  in  every  two  years. 

2.  State  Officers:  Members  of  the  board  of  public  works, 
(for  three  years'  term) ;  judges  of  the  supreme  court  (for 
five  years),  once  in  each  year.  Governor,  lieutenant-gov- 
ernor, secretary  of  state,  treasurer,  attorney -general.  State 
senators  (elected  in  each  territorial  district),  members  of  the 
State  House  of  Representatives  (elected  in  each  representa- 
tive district) ,  once  in  two  years.  State  commissioner  of  com- 
mon schools,  clerk  of  the  supreme  court,  once  in  three  years; 
auditor  of  the  State,  once  in  four  years. 

3.  District  Officers:  Circuit  judge  (for  six  years),  once  in 
two  years.  Judge  of  the  court  of  common  pleas  (for  five 
years) ,  once  in  five  years.  Member  of  the  State  board  of 
equalization,  once  in  ten  years. 

4.  County  Officers:  County  commissioners  (for  three 
years),  infirmary  directors  (for  three  years),  once  in  each 
year.  County  treasurer,  sheriff,  coroner,  once  in  two  years. 
County  auditor,  recorder,  surveyor,  judge  of  probate,  clerk 
of  court  of  common  pleas,  prosecuting  attorney,  once  in  three 
years. 

5.  City  Officers:  Members  of  the  board  of  police  commis- 
sioners (in  the   majority  of  cities),  members   of  board  of 

*  I  have  taken  the  foregoing  list  from  Bryce's  "  American  Commonwealth  "  (II, 
pp.  430,  431.  First  ed.)  after  comparing  it  with  the  latest  edition  of  the  "Ohio 
Voters'  Manual."  This  list,  as  given  above,  omits  all  officers  appointed  by 
'Councils,  as  not  material  to  my  argument. 

[662] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  ii 

infirmary  directors  (for  three  years),  trustee  of  water- works 
(for three  years),  once  every  year.  Mayor,  city  clerk,  audi- 
tor (if  an}^,  treasurer,  solicitor,  police  judge  (in  large  cities), 
prosecuting  attorney  of  the  police  court  (in  large  cities), 
clerk  of  the  police  court  (in  large  cities) ,  city  commissioner 
(in  second-class  cities),  marshal  (only  in  small  cities),  street 
commissioner,  city  engineer  and  fire  surve3?^or  (when  elected 
at  the  polls,  as  city  council  determine),  superintendent  of 
markets  (when  elected  at  the  polls  as  city  council  deter- 
mine), all  once  in  two  years. 

IV. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  comparison  between  a 
great  Province  of  Canada  and  a  great  State  of  the  Federal 
Republic,  that  the  legislative  departments  of  both  countries 
— the  House  of  Commons  of  the  Dominion  and  the  Legisla- 
tive Assembly  of  the  Province,  and  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  National  Congress,  and  the  two  houses  of  the 
State  Legislature — are  elected  directly  by  the  people  in  their 
respective  electoral  districts.  That  is  to  sa}-,  the  principle 
of  electing  men  who  act  in  a  legislative  and  representative 
capacity  is  strictly  observed  in  each  countr>\  But  here  the 
comparison  practically  ceases.  In  the  Province  of  Ontario 
all  public  officers  who  may  be  compared  with  those  in  Ohio 
— and  a  reference  to  the  two  lists  will  show  that  both  coun- 
tries have  necessarily  similar  classes  of  officials — are  ap- 
pointed by  some  permanent  or  responsible  authority, 
removed  from  direct  popular  influence,  while  in  the  Ameri- 
can State  they  are  elected  by  a  vote  at  the  polls  in  all  cases. 
The  mayors  and  reeves  of  Ontario,  as  I  have  already  said,  are 
somewhat  exceptional,  but  their  terms  of  office  are  very  brief 
unless  they  are  re-elected, — which  frequently  happens, — and 
they  do  not  fall  within  the  strict  category  of  such  permanent  ex- 
ecutive, clerical  or  administrative  officials,  as  clerks,  treasur- 
ers and  auditors,  who  are  appointed  by  the  councils  in  Canada 

[663] 


12  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

while  they  are  elected  directly  by  the  people  in  Ohio.  In 
that  State,  as  Dr.  James  Bryce  has  pointed  out,  there  are 
twenty -two  different  paid  ofl&cers — ^including,  for  argument 
sake,  legislators  in  that  class — which  a  voter  annually  has  to 
allot  by  his  vote;  that  is  to  say,  '*  he  must  in  each  and  every 
year  make  up  his  mind  as  to  the  qualifications  of  twenty-two 
different  persons  or  sets  of  persons  to  fill  certain  offices.'* 
**  As  nearly  all  these  offices  are  contested  on  political  lines,'* 
continues  the  same  high  authority,  *  *  though  the  respective 
principles  (if  any)  of  Republicans  and  Democrats  have  no 
more  to  do  with  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the  State  and 
local  offices  than  the  respective  principles  of  Methodists  and 
Baptists,  nominations  to  them  are  made  by  the  respective 
party  organizations.  Candidates  for  all,  or  nearly  all  the 
foregoing  offices,  are  nominated  in  conventions  composed  of 
delegates  in  primaries."  On  the  other  hand,  in  Ontario, 
the  electors  have  to  consider  the  claims  of  candidates  for 
election  to  the  House  of  Commons  of  the  Dominion  only 
once  every  four  or  five  years  (unless  sooner  dissolved,  and 
that  happens  only  imder  very  exceptional  circumstances) , 
and  of  candidates  for  election  to  the  House  of  Assembly  of 
the  Province  only  once  every  four  years  (unless  sooner  dis- 
solved, which  only  happens  under  rare  circumstances).  All 
public  officers  connected  with  those  legislative  bodies,  or  with 
the  public  service,  are  removed  fi-om  the  immediate  opera- 
tion of  these  elections  since  their  tenure  is  permanent,  and 
certain  classes  of  appointments,  when  vacant^ — such  as 
shrievalties,  registrarships,  county  attorneys,  etc.,  are  alone 
influenced  by  the  result,  since  political  patronage  necessarily 
rests  with  the  successful  party  as  an  incident  of  party  gov- 
ernment. I  ask  my  readers  to  keep  these  important  facts  in 
view  when  I  come  to  show  the  positive  advantages  the  pub- 
lic derive  from  the  infrequency  of  elections,  and  from  the 
checks  that  are  imposed  on  popular  caprice,  prejudice  and 
passion  by  the  system  of  appointments  to  all  offices  of  an 
administrative  or  judicial  character. 

[664] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officiai^  ?  13 

V. 

As  I  have  previously  shown,  it  is  not  a  question  of  elect- 
ing judges  or  the  officers  immediately  connected  with  the 
civil  service  that  is  directly  at  issue,  but  the  discussion  is 
confined  for  the  present  in  Ontario  to  certain  persons  whom 
it  is  attempted  to  class  as  county  officers.  But  the  nature 
of  the  discussion  will  best  be  understood  by  referring  to  the 
following  questions  which  appear  in  the  circular  that  has 
been  distributed  among  those  who  have  been  called  upon  to 
state  their  opinions  on  the  subjects  of  the  inquiry  before  the 
provincial  commission: 

*' Assuming  that  the  following  officials  are  those  under  considera- 
tion : 

Registrars  of  deeds, 
Local  masters, 
Sherififs, 

Local  and  deputy  registrars  of  the  high  court  of  justice, 

Deputy  clerks  of  the  crown, 

Clerks  of  county  courts. 

Registrars  of  surrogate  courts, 

County  attorneys  and  clerks  of  the  peace, 

Division  court  clerks, 

Division  court  bailiffs — 
"Do  you  approve  of  the  appointment  of  any,  or  all,  of  the  above 
officers  being  in  the  hands  of  the  provincial  government  (as  at  present), 
or  should  they,  or  any  of  them,  in  your  opinion  be  otherwise  selected- 
if  so,  by  whom,  and  for  what  reasons  ? 

"  If  you  advocate  a  change  in  the  mode  of  appointment  of  any  of 
the  above  officers,  how,  and  to  what  supervision  should  the  officer  be 
amenable  for  efficient  and  faithful  performance  of  duty  during  the 
term  of  office  ? 

"  Do  you  approve  of  the  system  of  paying  any,  or  all,  the  above 
officers  by  fees  (in  whole,  or  in  part  as  at  present)  ?  If  not,  what  other 
or  better  plan  do  you  suggest,  and  for  what  reasons  ? 

"  If  you  approve  of  election  by  the  people  of  the  above  officerj,  or 
any  of  them,  what  method  of  public  inspection,  during  the  term'  of 
office,  do  you  suggest  for  securing  uniformity  of  procedure,  and  the 
safety  of  the  public  ? 

"  If  you  approve  of  selection  by  the  municipal  council,  what  method 
of  public  inspection  do  you  suggest  with  a  view  to  securing  the  objects 
mentioned  in  the  previous  question  ?" 

[665] 


14 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 


It  will  be  seen  that  there  are  practically  two  questions  in- 
volved— one  in  relation  to  the  payment  of  public  officials, 
and  the  other  in  relation  to  the  mode  of  appointing  them. 
It  is  the  latter  question  which  is  of  greatest  importance,  since 
on  its  judicious  solution  rests,  in  a  large  degree,  the  future 
efficient  and  honest  administration  of  government;  but  before 
I  give  my  reasons  for  this  emphatic  opinion  it  will  be  well  if 
I  dispose  of  the  first  or  subordinate  question  of  salaries,  v/hich 
has  its  interest  for  American  readers  since  so  many  impor- 
tant officers  are  also  paid  by  fees  in  the  several  States.  The 
majority  of  the  officers  in  question  are  paid  by  fees  regulated 
by  statutes  applicable  to  their  respective  offices,  but  it  is 
only  sheriffs  and  registrars  who  receive  a  large  amount  of 
money  paid  this  way,  and  whose  salaries,  in  some  instances, 
are  believed  to  be  larger  than  their  services  merit.  As  a 
rule  the  sheriffs  are  paid  entirely  by  such  fees  as  remain  to 
them  after  paying  all  the  necessary  expenses  of  their  office. 
The  registrars  are  also  entitled  to  a  certain  amount  of  the 
fees  that  they  collect  under  the  law,  but  the  statute  regulat- 
ing their  office  limits  the  sum  they  can  retain  for  their  own 
use  up  to  $2500.     Beyond  that  amount  they  can  retain: 

Ninety  per  cent  in  excess  of  $2500,  and  not  exceeding  $3000. 

Eighty          •*          **          *•  3000,         **            "              3500. 

Seventy        **          *'          "  35oo,         "             "              4000. 

Sixty            "          "         '*  4000,         "            "              4500. 

Fifty             "          "          •*  4500. 

This  regulation  appears  to  bring  the  salaries  of  registrars, 
as  a  rule,  within  a  ver>^  moderate  amount,  while  it  appears 
from  the  official  returns  yearly  made  to  the  goveniment  of 
the  gross  and  net  amounts  of  fees  collected  by  the  sheriffs 
and  other  officers  named  above,  none  of  them  are  paid  what 
may  be  considered  in  any  vSense  extravagant  sums  or  beyond 
what  they  ought  to  receive  in  view  of  their  responsible  and 
onerous  duties;  indeed,  in  the  new  and  thinly  populated  dis- 
tricts, the  government  is,  by  the  law,  obliged  to  make  up 
the  deficiency  of  fees,  and  pay  them  an  amount  which  will 

[666] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  15 

bring  up  their  salary  to  at  least  $900  or  $1000.  The  follow- 
ing tables  will  show  fairly  enough  for  our  purpose  the 
average  amount  received  in  cities  and  counties  of  the 
province  by  the  officers  in  question. 

In  the  county  of  Carleton,  which  has  a  city,  Ottawa,  within  its 
limits  : 

Sherifif,  average  salary  for  five  years  previous  to  1893, foo3i 

Surrogate  judge  (held  by  county  judge),  commuted  at,    ....  500 

f  Local  master,*               average  for  five  years, 2294 

i  Deputy  registrar,*                 **          **          »*       5^^ 

f  County  attorney,*                  **          "          **       540 

i  Clerk  of  p3ace,*                    •«          **          "       1062 

C Deputy  clerk  of  crown,*      '*           ••          "       812 


((  i( 


J  County  court  clerk,*  *•  **  •* 

Surrogate  registrar,*  **  '♦  •• 


{County  court  clerk,*  **  034 

Surrogate  registrar,*  "  "  "       ........        920 

County  of  Huron,  without  a  city: 

Sheriff,  average  salary  for  five  years,      f  2013 

Surrogate  judge,  commuted  at, ^^2 

Local  master  and  deputy  registrar,*  commuted  at, 1250 

f  County  attorney,*         average  for  five  years, 564 

i  Clerk  of  peace,*                     "          "          "       862 

r  Deputy  clerk  of  crown,*      "          **          "       830 

710 

1191 

Then  there  are  the  salaries  of  registrars,  who  received  in 
1893,  in  the  most  populous  legal  divisions — the  city  of 
Toronto,  East  and  West — fees  to  the  gross  amount  of  $24,797 
and  $16,719  respectively,  of  which  the  registrars  received 
tmder  the  statutory  limitations  from  $4000  to  $4500  each. 
As  a  rule,  $3000  is  the  highest  average  amount  received  as 
salary  in  the  counties,  and  $500  is  the  lowest  in  a  very  few 
and  small  municipalities. 

Much  misconception  exists  as  regards  the  amount  of 
salaries  received  by  the  sheriffs  and  registrars,  and  has  con- 
sequently originated  the  present  agitation  on  the  subject; 
but  the  figures  I  have  just  given  clearly  show  that  none  of 
these  officers  are  overpaid,  as  is  the  case  with  sheriffs,  county 

*  The  offices  named  in  the  brackets  may  be,  and  are  generally,  held  under  tbc 
Iftw  by  the  same  person. 

[667J 


i6  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

clerks,  and  other  officials,  elected  b}^  the  people  in  some 
cities  and  counties  of  the  States  of  the  American  federation. 
In  the  case  of  registrars  the  law  practically  recognizes  the 
advisability  of  limiting  the  fee  system,  and  of  fixing  salaries 
as  far  as  possible.  ^  >r  my  own  part  I  agree  with  those  who 
believe  that  fixity  of  salary  and  permanency  of  tenure  are 
the  true  principles  to  be  followed  in  the  case  of  all  public 
officials.  Every  officer  should  receive  an  exact  sum,  equiva- 
lent to  the  value  of  his  ser\'ice  to  the  public,  and  commen- 
surate, of  course,  with  his  position  and  responsibility. 
Especially  should  the  respoUvSibilities  of  sherifFs  be  carefully 
considered  in  case  of  a  change  of  system.  These  officers 
are  liable  to  litigation  arising  from  the  mistakes  of  their 
deputies  and  agents.  Consequentl}^  in  fixing  their  salaries 
it  is  important  that  not  only  their  dignified  position  as  the 
highest  executive  officer  of  the  courts,  but  also  their  legal 
responsibilities  should  be  borne  in  mind,  and  they  should  be 
saved  from  all  personal  losses  which  do  not  accrue  from  any 
ignorance  or  carelessness  on  their  part.  One  thing  is  quite 
certain,  that  such  officers  should  have  full  control  over  the 
appointment  of  their  deputies  and  officers,  for  otherw^ise  it 
would  be  unfair  to  make  them  responsible  for  the  acts  of 
officers  through  whom  they  necessarily  execute  many  of 
their  functions.  But  while  we  may  see  the  difficulty  of  a 
change  of  system  in  the  case  of  sheriffs,  there  is  none  in 
respect  to  the  other  officials  in  question,  and  they  should 
receive  a  fixed  salary  from  the  public  treasur>%  and  pay  into 
it  all  fees  they  collect  by  virtue  of  their  offices.  As  things 
are  now,  the  fee  system  is  not  liable  to  the  great  abuses  to 
which  it  is  necessarily  subject  under  the  elective  system  in 
American  States.  Politics  run  high  in  Canada,  but  contri- 
butions to  corruption  funds  are  not  made  by  public  officials, 
and  the  political  manager  is  unable  to  avail  himself  of  the 
advantages  which  the  fee  system  gives  him  in  the  States  of 
the  Federal  Union  in  the  case  of  candidates  whose  election 
depends  on  skillful  party  manipulation  and  all  those  arts 

[668] 


Ei,ECTED  OR  Appointed  Officiaus  ?  ij 

which  the  "machine"  practices  to  carry  their  ticket  If 
the  fee  system  were  entirely  swept  away  in  every  State  of 
the  Union,  the  party  machine  would  be  deprived  of  a  large 
amount  of  funds  that  now  periodically  go  to  corrupt  the 
electors  and  place  certain  professional  poUticians  in  office. 

VI. 

Coming  now  to  the  important  question  at  issue,  it  is  sug- 
gested, for  reasons  which  are  entirely  inadequate,  to  change 
the  system  which  has  always  obtained  in  Canada,  and  give 
to  the  people  a  direct  choice  of  certain  public  officers  who 
are  ministerial  and  executive,  and  have  also  important  duties 
to  perform  in  connection  with  the  administration  of  justice 
The  crown,  neither  in  England  nor  in   Canada,  has  ever 
yielded  its  right  to  appoint  such  officers;  in  other  words 
such  patronage  has  always  been  one  of  its  prerogatives      In 
old  times  of   English   history-,    when    the    sovereign'  was 
attempting  to  push  his  prerogative  to  extremes  and  to  limit 
the  powers  of  the  House  of  Commons-in  those  times  when 
paihamentary  government  was  in  a  process  of  evolution- 
offices  were  a  prolific  fund  of  corruption  in  parliament  and 
constituencies.     Now,  with  the  limitation  of  the  powers  of 
the  crown,  the  old  prerogative  right  of  appointments  has 
been  practically  handed  to  the  constitutional  advisers  of  the 
sovereip,  responsible  to  parliament.     With  the  development 
ot  parliamentarj-  government  and  the  establi.shment  of  wise 
rules  which  regulate  appointments  and  promotions  to  the 
permanent  civil  service,  the  flagrant  abuses  that  crept  into 
the  old   system   and  disgraced  the  whole  body  politic  of 
England  have  gradually  disappeared.     The  ' '  spoils  ' '  system 
is  entirely  unknown  in  Great  Britain.     At  the  present  time 
says  an  authority*  on  such  subjects,  "it is  worthy  of  note 
that  direct  election  to  office-supposed  to  be  characteristic 

rl!«'  %rT'^':  "P'"t-^^^  "°  Pla^  in  English  political 
laeas.     The  few  instances  in  which  it  occurs  are  regarded 

•  Professor  Robertson,  M.  p.,  LLD.,  article,  "  Government,"  in  Rncy  Brit 

[669]  ■        • 


i8  Annai3  of  the  American  Academy. 

with  indifference.  The  election  of  coroner  by  the  electors  is 
universally  condemned.  In  the  few  parishes  where  the 
clergyman  may  be  appointed  by  the  parishioners,  the  right 
is  often  left  to  be  exercised  by  the  bishop. ' '  Canada,  as  in 
the  case  of  her  legal  and  political  institutions  generally,  has 
closely  adhered  to  the  practice  of  the  parent  state  with 
respect  to  appointments.  In  the  years  that  preceded  the 
establishment  of  responsible  government  in  a  complete  sense 
— from  1 791  to  1841-54 — the  appointment  of  public  officials- 
of  all  classes  was  in  the  hands  of  the  governors,  cliques  and 
compacts.  Those  were  the  days  of  irresponsible  officialism 
and  famil}^  compacts,  when  Downing  street  ruled  in  purely 
local  affairs,  and  favorites  of  governors  and  high  officials 
were  selected  with  an  utter  indifference  to  the  wishes  of  the 
majority  of  the  people,  or  the  popular  assembly.  According 
to  Lord  Durham,  who  reported  in  1839  on  the  state  of  affairs 
in  Canada  after  the  Rebellion  of  1837-38,  what  was  known 
in  Upper  Canada,  now  Ontario,  as  "the  family  compact  " — 
a  combination  of  aristocracy  and  officialism  rather  than  a 
purely  family  connection — "  possessed  almost  all  the  highest 
public  offices,  by  means  of  which,  and  of  its  influence  in 
the  executive  council,  it  wielded  all  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment; it  maintained  influence  in  the  legislature  by  means  of 
its  predominance  in  the  legislative  council;  and  it  disposed 
of  the  large  number  of  petty  posts  which  are  in  the  patronage 
of  the  government  of  the  province. ' '  The  executive  councils 
in  those  days  of  struggle  for  popular  government  '  *  enjoyed 
the  confidence  of  no  considerable  party,  whilst  the  family- 
compact  was  in  fact  supported  by  no  very  large  number  of 
Dersons  of  any  party."  Such  things  were  possible  in  days 
when  the  executive  council  owed  no  responsibilitj^  to  the 
people  or  their  representatives  in  the  popular  branch  of  the- 
legislature. 

From  1840  to  1854  a  responsible  ministr>^  was  established 
in  all  the  provinces  of  the  present  Dominion ,  although  soon 
after  the  legislative  union  of  the  Canadas  in  1841  one  of  the 

[670] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  19 

goveniors-general,  Lord  Metcalfe,  attempted  to  make  appoint- 
ments without  reference  to  his  constitutional  advisers,  the  last 
effort  of  prerogative  attempted  by  a  representative  of  the 
crown  in  Canada.  Since  those  unsettled  times,  the  rule 
that  obtains  in  England  has  been  carried  out  in  all  the 
provinces  of  Canada.  All  the  appointments  are  made  by 
the  governor-general  of  the  Dominion,  and  by  the  lieutenant- 
governors  of  the  provinces  in  accordance  with  statute  or 
usage.  Such  appointments,  however,  as  shrievalties,  regis- 
trarships,  and  other  ofl&ces  mentioned  above  do  not  come 
within  the  category  of  the  appointments  to  the  civil  service, 
but  are  made  by  the  government  from  their  political  sup- 
porters as  a  rule,  and  as  a  necessary  sequence  of  party  gov- 
ernment. They  are  often,  though  not  necessarily,  made  on 
the  recommendation  of  a  member  and  other  influential  per- 
sons supporting  the  government,  whenever  a  vacancy  occurs 
in  the  office; — removals  for  political  reasons  or  "  rotation  in 
office  '*  being  unknown  to  Canada's  political  system — but  in 
every  case  they  are  the  subject  of  discussion  in  the  executive 
council,  which  becomes  directly  responsible  for  the  advice  it 
gives  to  the  lieutenant-governor,  w^hose  duty  it  is  to  inform 
himself  thoroughly  with  respect  to  all  nominations  to  office, 
before  he  signs  the  commission  or  order  in  council  authoriz- 
ing the  appointment.  Should  he  believe  from  facts  that 
have  come  to  his  knowledge,  that  an  appointment  is  most 
undesirable  in  the  public  interests — a  very  rare  case  indeed 
in  Canadian  political  annals — it  is  for  him  to  exercise  that 
pressure  which  he  can  constitutionally  exercise  on  all 
matters  on  which  he  is  advised  and  his  action  is  required. 
The  legislative  assembly,  as  a  body,  does  not  assume  to 
make  such  appointments  or  to  interfere  directly  with  the 
legal  powers  of  the  executive  authority  in  such  matters; 
but  it  may,  and  sometimes  does,  sharply  criticise  and 
even  censure  the  conduct  of  the  executive  with  respect  to 
appointments.  In  every  case  it  has  a  right  to  the  fullest 
information  on  the  subject.     Here  is  one  of  the  advantages 

[671] 


20  Annate  of  the  American  Academy. 

of  the  system  of  parliamentary  government,  as  worked  out 
in  England  and  Canada.  The  presence  of  the  advisers  of 
the  executive — practically  the  executive  itself — in  the  legis- 
lature, gives  that  body  supreme  control  over  its  acts.  A 
house  divided  into  two  contending  parties,  a  government 
and  an  opposition,  will  not  fail  to  give  due  importance  to 
any  aggravated  case  of  the  abuse  of  patronage.  Any  gov- 
ernment or  member  thereof,  that  has  been  guilty  of  such 
abuse,  is  open  to  the  fullest  criticism  in  the  legislature  and 
in  the  public  pres*  Nothing  can  be  concealed  from  public 
view,  and  responsibility  rests  where  it  should.  Ever>'  mem- 
ber of  a  government,  under  the  English  or  Canadian  system 
of  parliamentary  government,  must  act  under  a  feeling  of 
direct  responsibility.  Every  such  minister  has  his  ambi- 
tions, and  dare  not  in  the  face  of  public  opinion  to  which  he 
must  submit  himself  sooner  or  later,  make  what  would  be  a 
notoriously  bad  appointment.  Personal  qualifications,  char- 
acter and  local  sentiment  in  the  district  where  the  ofl&cer  is 
placed,  are  all  questions  to  be  immediately  considered  by  the 
member  and  the  minister  recommending  the  filling  of  the 
office.  Of  course  there  are  defects  in  such  a  system  as  in  all 
methods  of  government.  Some  appointments  are  weak,  if 
none  are  notoriously  bad;  but  they  are  on  the  whole  good. 
The  public  service  of  Ontario,  like  that  of  Canada,  generally 
has,  as  a  rule,  been  creditable  to  the  country,  and  re- 
markably free  from  political  influences  when  men  are  once 
appointed  to  an  office.  Corruption  and  dishonesty  are  not 
charged  against  it  as  a  class.  Permanency  of  tenure,  free- 
dom from  political  intrigue,  independence  of  popular  elec- 
tions, are  the  characteristics  of  the  service. 

Such  satisfactory  results,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind, 
have  been  produced  by  the  operation  of  responsible  govern- 
ment. It  is  claimed  that  the  system  gives  too  much  power 
to  the  executive  authority  since  all  patronage  rests  in  their 
hands,  but  experience  shows  that  the  exercise  of  the  power 
is  on  the  whole  decidedly  in  the  public  interest.    An  executive 

[672] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  21 

should  be  strong  under  such  conditions.  If  the  govern- 
ment did  not  act  under  a  sense  of  immediate  responsibility 
to  the  legislature,  if  appointments  were  not  limited  by  civil 
service  rules  of  law,  if  all  public  officials  had  not  practically 
a  life  tenure,  then  patronage  would  be  dangerous  as  every 
American  publicist  and  statesman  knows  full  well. 

It  is  impossible  to  believe  that,  were  appointments  in  any 
cases  taken  from  the  lieutenant-governor  in  council  and 
given  to  a  county  council — the  less  dangerous  choice,  were 
it  a  practical  question  between  that  method  and  election  by 
popular  vote — the  public  interests  w^ould  be  better  served, 
and  wiser  appointments  made.  A  greater  responsibility 
must  rest  on  a  minister  of  the  crown,  and  on  the  govern- 
ment who  are  responsible  for  the  acts  of  each  and  all  its 
members — on  a  government  immediately  amenable  to  the 
criticism  and  censure  of  the  legislature,  and  later  to  the 
people  at  the  polls — than  can  be  placed  on  a  body  of  muni- 
cipal councilors,  acting  within  an  inferior  and  limited  sphere 
of  action,  and  not  exposed  to  the  wide  range  of  discussion 
to  which  the  highest  legislative  body  in  the  province  cim 
submit  its  own  committee — the  executive  council.  The 
conscience  of  a  man  in  office  must  bear  some  proportion  to 
his  duties  and  responsibilities.  A  man  in  a  small  area  of 
action  and  criticism  can  never  as  clearly  be  brought  to  see 
the  consequence  of  his  political  conduct  as  one  in  the  wide 
theatre  of  national  action.  Noblesse  oblige  is  more  heard  of 
at  Washington  than  even  in  Boston  municipal  politics.  It 
says  much  for  the  efficiency  and  integrity  of  the  public 
service  of  Ontario — and  I  refer  here  particularly  to  the  class 
of  officials  in  question — of  the  service  appointed  under  such 
conditions  as  I  have  mentioned,  that  it  has  not  been  shown 
guilty  for  the  past  twenty-seven  years  of  such  incompe- 
tency and  malversation  of  funds  as  have  even  occurred  in 
connection  with  the  funds  of  a  few  county  councils.  What 
cases  of  mismanagement,  speculation  and  jobbery  have 
come  to  light  of  late  have  been  in  the  administration  of  the 

[673] 


22  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

affairs  of  the  largest  Canadian  cities.  At  the  present  time 
the  city  of  Montreal  appears  to  require  a  Parkhurst,  and 
Toronto  has  asked  the  county  judge  to  investigate  charges 
that  have  been  made — and  the  inquiry'-  has  proved,  with  too 
much  truth — against  certain  aldermen  of  selling  their  vote  and 
influence  to  contractors.  It  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  in 
these  cases  it  is  the  elected  men,  the  aldermen,  whose  conduct 
is  arraigned.  It  is  the  elective  principle  that  is  now  in  ques- 
tion, when  applied  to  men  whose  duties  are  those  of  managers 
of  a  corporation.  Indeed,  there  are  many  influential  and 
thinking  men  in  Canadian  cities — in  Toronto  especially — 
who  express  the  opinion  that  a  small  permanent  commis- 
sion appointed  by  the  government  would  best  manage  civic 
affairs.  Still,  in  the  face  of  such  facts,  it  is  proposed  to 
extend  the  principle  even  further,  and  disturb  a  system  of 
appointments  which  has  exhibited  no  such  discreditable 
results  as  we  have  seen  in  pities  and  even  counties. 

As  things  are  now,  municipal  elections  are  kept  fairly 
free— in  the  great  majority  of  counties,  largely  free — of  all 
political  influences;  but  it  is  quite  certain  that  if  these 
councils  are  to  be  made  the  arena  of  political  intrigue  for  the 
filling  of  provincial  offices,  it  will  not  be  long  before  they 
will  become  notorious  for  political  bitterness  and  worse,* 
and  the  party  spirit  which  runs  sufficiently  high  in  Canada 
under  ordinary  conditions  will  be  intensified  to  a  degree, 
and  bring  about  results  of  which  every  citizen  across  the 
frontier  can  give  Canadians  some  very  practical  examples. 

VII. 

But  Canadians  need  not  go  far  to  come  to  a  conclusion  as 
to  the  effects  of  an  elective  system  when  applied  to  any  class 
of  public  officials.  Their  neighbors  in  the  States  of  the 
Federal  Republic  have  been,  for  many  years  in  their  history, 

*  Read  what  Mr,  Fiske  says  ("  Civil  Governraent  in  the  United  States,"  p.  135) 
with  respect  to  the  evils  that  have  ariseu  from  "the  encroachments  of  national 
politics  upon  municipal  politics." 

[674] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  2$ 

-giving  the  world  ver>'  significant  examples  of  the  results  of 
such  a  system.  Their  experience  is  submitted  to  the  serious 
reflection  of  those  who  would  change  the  law  which  makes 
the  government  responsible  for  all  public  appointments,  and 
give  in  its  place  a  system  which  places  the  responsibility 
nowhere.  Can  any  one  argue  that  the  body  of  the  voting 
public  who  "elect  can  be  made  responsible  for  the  result? 
The  legislature  in  the  first  place,  and  the  people  at  a  final 
stage,  can  censure  a  government,  or  turn  it  out  of  office, 
since  ministers  are  directly  responsible  for  every  act  of 
administration.  But  Qia's  custodiet  custodies  ?  Who  will 
check  the  people  ? 

Among  the  sources  of  the  strength  of  the  Canadian 
system  of  government  are  these:  the  infrequency  of  political 
•elections;  the  holding  of  elections  for  the  Dominion  parlia- 
ment and  for  the  legislative  assemblies  of  the  provinces  at 
different  dates;  the  separation  of  federal  issues,  as  a  rule, 
from  provincial  questions — though  the  attempt  is  too  often 
made  to  mix  them ;  the  practical  separation  of  municipal  from 
provincial  or  other  political  questions;  the  permanency  or 
non-political  tenure  of  the  civil  service.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  weaknesses  of  the  American  system — in  fact,  the  evils 
that  are  sapping  the  republican  and  purely  democratic  insti- 
tutions of  the  States — mainly  arise  from  these  causes:  the 
intimate  connection  between  national,  State  and  municipal 
politics;  the  frequency  of  elections  which  bring  into  play  all 
the  schemes  and  machinations  of  the  party  managers  and 
*'  bosses;"  the  popular  election  and  short  tenure  of  so  many 
public  officials  who,  as  a  consequence,  become  more  or  less 
partisans,  and  supply  even  now,  in  defiance  of  the  law  in 
many  States,  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  corruption 
funds  of  political  parties. 

The  conclusions,  then,  to  which  an  impartial  and  honest 
observ^er  of  contemporary^  political  management  in  the 
United  States  must  inevitably  come  are  these,  briefly 
summed  up: 

[675] 


24  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

• 

That  the  party  machine,  as  managed  by  the  boss,  is  de- 
structive of  public  morality. 

That  it  is  the  elective  and  the  "  spoils  "  system  by  which 
a  horde  of  public  officials  obtain  office  that  gives  vitality  to 
the  machine  and  its  creatures,  and  Is  weakening  the  founda- 
tions of  republican  or  democratic  institutions. 

That  rings  and  bosses  will  exist  and  thrive  as  long  as  the 
great  majority  of  public  officers,  including  judges,  are 
elected  or  appointed  on  political  lines. 

That  the  security  of  the  commonwealth  depends  on  the 
establishment  of  a  permanent  public  service  in  every  State, 
in  the  appointment  of  the  judiciary  by  a  regularly  constituted 
authority  like  the  governor  or  the  legislature;  on  the  removal 
of  municipal  contests  from  Federal  or  State  elections;  on  lim- 
iting in  every  way  the  number  of  civic  or  court  officers 
elected  by  the  people  and  placing  them  in  the  hands  of 
mayors  or  councils;  on  giving  a  life  tenure — that  is  to  say, 
during  good  behavior — to  all  important  executive,  judicial 
and  administrative  officers;  on  the  effective  operation  of  the 
Australian  ballot  in  every  election,  civic.  State  or  national, 
and  on  the  general  adoption  and  execution  of  most  stringent 
laws  against  bribery  and  corruption  in  every  possible  form. 

That  by  such  measures  the  machine  will  soon  break  down, 
since  the  party  boss  will  not  have  the  same  facilities  for 
exercising  his  peculiar  arts  that  he  has  at  present,  while  he 
can  practically  control  the  election  or  patronage  of  so  many 
public  offices. 

VIII. 

No  one  who  studies  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  United 
States,  or  who  has  had  opportunities,  like  the  writer,  of 
conversing  with  men  of  intelligence  and  education  whose 
minds  are  not  warped  by  party  prejudice,  and  who  believe 
that  frankness  is  better  than  silence  when  their  coimtry's 
honor  or  stability  is  at  stake — no  one  under  such  circum- 
stances but  must  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  are 

[676] 


Bisected  or  Appointed  Officials?  25 

already  a  number  of  people  in  the  republic — a  small  frv-.'tion, 
it  is  true,  of  the  nearly  seventy  millions  of  people,  but  still  a 
•*  saving  remnant  "  perhaps — who  are  striving  for  a  radical 
change  in  their  elective  system.  We  have  evidence  of  this 
wise  and  growing  sentiment  in  the  strenuous  and,  in  part, 
successful  efforts  made  of  recent  years  to  build  up  a  perman- 
ent civil  service  for  the  nation,  in  such  constitutional  changes 
as  have  been  passed  in  the  State  of  New  York  for  the  separa- 
tion of  municipal  from  State  elections,*  in  the  strengthening 
of  the  executive  authority  of  the  mayors  in  numerous  cities 
and  giving  them  control  of  important  civic  appointments,  in 
the  lengthening  of  the  term  of  office  of  the  State  judiciary 
and  other  officials  in  several  States,  and  lastly,  though  not 
least,  in  the  adoption  of  the  ballot  system  of  Australia. 

The  proposition  that  has  been  sometimes  urged  that  the 
Presidential  term  should  be  at  least  six  years  is  also  an 
evidence  of  the  current  that  is  setting  in  against  too  frequent 
elections,  which  keep  the  public  mind  in  constant  state  of 
agitation,  unsettle  business,  and  give  ready  occupation  to 
the  professional  politician.  Perhaps  in  no  respect  has  there 
been  a  more  earnest  effort  to  limit  the  elective  principle  than 
in  the  case  of  the  judiciary.  Everyone  will  admit  that  the 
strongest  judiciary,  for  learning  and  character,  is  the  Federal 
bench,  which  is  removed  from  all  popular  influences,  since  it 
is  nominated  and  appointed  by  the  President  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  has  practically  a  life  tenure,  and  cannot 
have  its  compensation  diminished  during  the  term  of  office 
of  a  judge.     It  is  needless  to  cite  instances  of  the  w^eakness 

*  It  is  an  interesting  fact  which  may  here  be  mentioned,  that  Canada  has  had,  by 
law  and  practice,  for  years,  the  reforms  that  the  New  York  convention  recom- 
mended and  the  people  of  the  State  recently  ratified  :  a  separation  of  municipal 
from  State  elections  ;  naturalization  laws  ;  civil  service  statutes  ;  prohibition  of 
riders  in  appropriation  bills  ;  printing  of  all  bills  before  passage ;  prohibitions 
against  pool-selling,  book-making  and  lotteries.  The  Australian  ballot  and 
stringent  anti-bribery  and  corruption  laws  have  been  in  operation  for  years. 
Contract  labor  in  prisons  is  permitted,  not  disallowed,  as  in  the  New  York  con- 
stitution—confessedly its  weak  point,  showing  the  influence  of  the  labor  element 
on  the  politicians  of  the  convention.  All  these  Canadian  reforms  have  been 
among  the  results  of  a  strong  executive,  represented  in  and  responsible  to  parlia- 
ment. 

[677] 


26  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

of  the  State  judiciary  which  owes  its  position  to  party — we 
have  had  recent  illustration  of  such  weakness  in  the  case  of 
a  judge  at  Albany — but  happily  for  the  interests  of  justice 
the  consequences  have  never  become  so  serious  as  one  would, 
with  some  reason,  suppose  they  would  be  ;  and  that  chiefly 
on  account  of  men,  once  on  the  bench,  wishing  to  earn  the 
good  opinion  of  the  better  elements  of  the  bar — notably  higk 
in  every  State — and  feeling  that  respect  for  law  and  its  attri- 
butes which  animates  all  men  brought  up  under  the  influence 
of  English  legal  institutions  once  they  are  placed  on  the 
judgment  seat.  Nearly  forty  years  ago  John  Stuart  Mill,'*^ 
writing  on  this  very  subject,  apprehended  ' '  that  the  practice 
of  submitting  judicial  ofi&cers  to  periodical  popular  re-electioa 
will  be  found  to  be  one  of  the  most  dangerous  errors  ever 
yet  committed  b^''  democracy,  and  were  it  not  that  the  prac- 
tical good  sense,  which  never  totally  deserts  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  is  said  to  be  producing  a  reaction  likely  in  no 
long  time  to  lead  to  the  retraction  of  the  error,  it  might  with 
reason  be  regarded  as  the  first  great  downward  step  in  the 
degeneration  of  modern  democratic  government."  Writing 
a  quarter  of  a  century  later  Dr.  Bryce  tells  us  that  ' '  in  many 
American  States  the  State  judges  are  men  of  moderate  ability 
and  scanty  learning,  and  sometimes  vastl}^  inferior  to  the 
best  of  the  advocates  who  practice  before  them. ' '  He  admits 
that  pecuniary  corruption  seems  to  be  very  rare  among  them, 
but  '  *  there  are  other  ways  in  which  sinister  influences  can 
play  on  a  judge's  mind,  and  impair  that  confidence  in  his 
impartiality  which  is  almost  as  necessary  as  impartiality 
itself."  And,  he  adds,  with  obvious  force,  *' apart  from  all 
questions  of  dishonesty  or  unfairness  it  is  an  evil  that  the 
bench  should  not  be,  intellectually  and  socially  at  least,  on  a 
level  with  the  bar."  But  while  the  mischief  that  has  arisen 
from  the  application  of  the  elective  principle  to  the  State 
judiciary  is  undoubtedly  "serious  "   in  a  measure,  justice  is 

♦  See  "  Considerations   on    Representative    Government,"    Chap.    XIV.      AL9» 
remarjcs  of  Mr.  Fiske,  '*  Civil  Government,"  pp.  179,  180. 

[678] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials?  27 

fairly  administered  on  the  whole,  not  onl}-  for  the  reasons  I 
have  briefly  stated  above,  but  because  in  vSO  many  States  an 
upright  and  good  judge  has  reason  to  expect  a  long  tenure 
of  office.  The  hope  entertained  by  Mr.  Mill  has  not  yet 
been  fully  realized,  but  nevertheless  the  tendency  of  a  sound 
public  opinion  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  salaries  have  been 
generally  raised,  and  the  terms  of  office  lengthened.*  Good 
judges  are  continued  from  term  to  term,  so  that  a  better  class 
of  men  are  encouraged  to  accept  this  high  responsible  posi- 
tion. It  is  significant  that  of  at  least  thirty  States  that  have 
revised  their  constitution  in  essential  respects  within  fifteen 
years  or  so,  only  one  has  taken  the  appointment  from  the 
legislature  or  governor  and  entrusted  it  to  the  popular  vote. 
Perhaps  the  time  is  not  far  off  when  the  judiciary  will  have 
a  life  tenure  of  office,  even  though  election  by  popular  vote 
remains  in  force  in  the  majority  of  States,  as  at  present. 

IX. 

I  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  the  experiences  of  the 
United  States  in  working  out  the  elective  principle  in  thei* 
system  of  government  and  especially  in  connection  with  those 
classes  of  public  officials  who  should  be  non-political  in  their 
tenure,  so  that  my  Canadian  readers  may  thoroughly 
appreciate  the  consequences  of  the  arguments  of  those  who 
have  forced  the  government  of  the  premier  province  of 
Ontario — a  province  governed  on  the  whole  with  discretion 
and  ability,  and  where  officials  are,  generally  speaking,  able 
and  conscientious  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties — to  gather 
the  opinions  of  the  intelligence  of  the  country,  whether  they 
should  not  inaugurate  a  system  which  has  been  confessedly 
productive  of  so  many  injurious  results  on  the  other  side  of 
the  border.     I  believe  that  one  or  two  thoughtless  and  ill- 

*  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  New  Hampshire  and  Delaware  alone  retain  a 
system  of  life  tenure  or  of  good  behavior.  In  the  other  States  the  longest  term  is 
in  Pennsylvania,  21  years ;  the  shortest  in  Vermont,  2 ;  in  one  State  it  is  15 ;  in 
another,  14 ;  in  four,  12  ;  in  one,  10 ;  in  three,  9  ;  in  seven,  8 ;  in  ten,  6 ;  in  the  re- 
aiaining  States,  from  4  to  7. 

[679] 


28     Annals  of  thk  American  Academy. 

informed  persons  have  ventured  to  go  so  far  as  to  urge  the 
election  of  the  minor  judiciary  like  police  magistrates  and 
county  judges;  but  such  persons  do  not  in  any  way  represent 
the  intelligence  or  wisdom  which  governs  the  great  body  of 
the  people  in  a  province,  which,  above  all  other  sections, 
prides  itself  in  its  complete  and  well-administered  system  of 
local  government,  and  in  its  free  education,  which  gives 
every  boy  and  girl  in  the  land  admirable  opportunities  from 
the  common  school  to  the  collegiate  institute  or  high  school 
or  the  provincial  university  with  its  large  professorial  staff. 
Canada  has  one  of  the  best  devised  systems  of  government 
in  the  world.  Its  strength  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is 
based  on  the  experiences  of  the  two  great  countries  to  which 
Canadians  naturally  look  for  instruction  or  warning — Eng- 
land and  the  United  States.  Its  institutions  have  kept  pace 
with  the  development  of  the  sound  principles  of  parlia- 
mentary and  federal  government,  and  possess  all  that 
elasticity  and  capacity  to  meet  critical  situations  as  they 
arise,  which  is  wanting  in  the  too  rigid  system  of  the  United 
States  whose  constitution  is  mainly  based  on  principles  which 
existed  in  the  middle  of  last  centur>%  and  are  now  not  quite 
equal  to  the  conditions  of  modem  political  progress.  Neither 
at  Washington  nor  in  any  State  of  the  Union  is  there  a 
ministry  owing  responsibility  to  the  people's  representatives, 
and  the  consequence  is  a  constant  friction  between  the 
executive  and  legislative  authorities,  and  an  absence  of  all 
such  control  of  legislation  and  administration,  as  exists 
under  a  system  of  parliamentary  government.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  at  Ottaw^a  and  in  ever}^  province  of  the 
Canadian  federation,  a  cabinet  which  represents  the  majority 
of  the  people  as  represented  in  the  legislature,  which  is 
constitutionally  bound  to  explain  and  defend  every  executive 
and  administrative  act,  from  the  appointment  of  a  lieutenant- 
governor  or  a  judge  to  a  sheriff,  registrar  or  county  attorney. 
Its  tenure  of  office  depends  on  the  confidence  of  the  legis- 
lature and  if  its  members  forfeit  that,  then  they  may  appeal 

[680] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials? 


29 


to  the  people  in  accordance  with  the  practice  and  rule  of 
responsible  government.  Such  a  deadlock  as  may  occur  at 
any  time  between  President  and  Congress  within  the  next 
two  years  is  impossible  under  the  Canadian  system.  The 
executive  in  Canada  is  always  represented  and  consequently 
able  to  exercise  a  potent  influence  in  the  halls  of  the  legis- 
lature by  the  means  of  ministers  responsible  to  the  popular 
house.  An  appeal  to  the  people  as  a  consequence  of  a  dead- 
lock or  crisis,  will  immediately  settle  all  difiiculties  and 
bring  in  either  the  same  ministry  or  a  new  cabinet  with 
adequate  support  to  carry  their  measures  in  parliament,  and 
administer  public  affairs.  The  remedy  under  such  circum- 
stances is  speedy  and  decisive — not  delayed,  as  in  the  United 
States,  by  the  checks  and  guards  that  prevent  popular 
opinion  acting  immediately  on  the  executive  and  adminis- 
tration. In  Canada  the  judiciary  is  independent  equally  of 
the  crown  and  of  popular  influences,  since  a  judge  can  only 
be  removed  during  his  life  tenure  of  ofiice  by  successful 
impeachment  in  parliament.  The  public  service  enjoys  all 
the  advantages  that  arise  from  permanency  of  tenure  and 
independence  of  a  popular  vote.  The  people  know  on  whom 
to  fix  responsibility  for  every  bad  appointment.  Under  the 
system  of  the  United  States  an  incapable  and  even  unworthy 
man  may  be  appointed  to  an  ofiice,  and  continue  in  it  in  the 
majority  of  cases  as  long  as  he  can  retain  the  confidence  and 
support  of  the  party  manager  of  his  district.  An  incom- 
petent man  may  be  elected  time  and  again,  and  the  nation 
know  and  care  nothing  about  it,  but  in  Canada  the  humblest 
appointment  may  be  subject  to  the  rigid  scrutiny  of  the 
parhament  of  Canada  or  of  the  legislature  of  a  province, 
according  as  it  is  of  Dominion  or  provincial  character.  All 
the  debates  of  the  parliament  and  the  legislatures  of  Canada 
are  reported  in  the  press  to  an  extent  that  is  not  customary 
in  the  case  of  Congress  or  of  the  State  legislatures,  and  what 
is  said  reaches  every  corner  of  the  Dominion.  Canadians 
can  fix  the  blame  on  some  one,  but  who  is  to  punish  the 

[681] 


I 


30  Annals  of  the  American  Academy. 

party  manager  or  the  people  misled  by  him  ?  A  system  of 
government  like  that  of  Canada  which  places  the  respon- 
sibility on  a  body  of  legally  constituted  advisers  of  the 
crown,  or  in  other  words  a  committee  of  the  legislature,  has 
clearly  enormous  advantages  in  the  case  of  appointments  to 
public  office  over  a  system  like  that  of  the  United  States 
which  spreads  responsibility  over  so  wide  a  surface  that  no 
one  may  be  reached. 

The  writer  believes,  after  giving  much  consideration  to 
this  important  subject,  that  it  would  be  indeed  an  unhappy 
hour  for  the  good  and  efficient  government  of  Canada, 
were  the  intelligence  of  any  section  to  be  so  blinded  as  to 
lead  it  away  from  the  sound  doctrines  that  have  hitherto 
preserved  us  from  the  evils  which  have  weakened  the  po- 
litical structure  of  the  Federal  Republic.  If  in  a  moment 
of  indiscretion  any  Canadian  legislature  were  to  yield  to 
the  ill-advised  demands  of  party  in  order  to  obtain  a  tem- 
porary political  advantage,  and  attempt  the  experiment  of 
the  elective  system  in  the  case  of  the  officials  whose  tenure 
of  office  is  now  a  matter  of  deliberate  inquiry,  it  would  be 
literally  the  thin  edge  of  a  wedge  which  would  gradually 
and  surel}'-  split  up  the  durable  foundation  on  which  govern- 
ment rests.  The  history  of  the  American  States  very  clearly 
shows  that  when  you  once  give  certain  privileges  and  rights 
to  a  people  it  is  not  possible  to  withdraw  them  directly  and 
immediately.  No  politician  would  dare  now"  to  ask  for  such 
constitutional  changes  as  would  suddenly-  sweep  away  the 
entire  elective  principle  in  the  case  of  all  national  and  State 
administrative,  executive  and  judicial  officers,  except  the 
president,  vice-president,  governors,  lieutenant-governors, 
and  political  heads  of  departments  who  occupy  positions 
somewhat  analogous  to  those  of  ministers  of  the  crown  but 
without  their  responsibilities.*     All  that  may  be  attempted 

'  *  "  The  great  number  of  candidates  for  election  confuses  and  disgusts  the  voters 
in  much  the  same  degree  that  it  makes  the  business  of  caucus  management 
intricate,  active  and  profitable.  The  election  of  such  officers  as  constables, 
county  clerks,  secretaries,  justices  and  judges,  whose  functions  are  in  no  sense 

[682] 


Elected  or  Appointed  Officials? 


31 


IS  to  curtail  and  modify  those  privileges  from  time  to  time, 
as  has  already  been  done  in  the  case  of  municipal  elective 
officers  and  of  the  judiciary.  If  once  in  Canada  the  elective 
principle  were  applied  to  sheriffs,  registrars  and  a  few  other 
officials  in  the  province,  it  would  not  be  long  before  a 
politician  would  make  himself  popular  by  extending  the 
system  to  police  magistrates,  and  all  classes  of  officials.  In 
all  probability,  the  pressure  would  be  so  great  even  on  the 
Dominion  parliament  that  it  w^juld  have  great  difficulty  in 
stemming  the  torrent  that  provincial  indiscretion  might  set 
flowing  by  the  removal  of  those  wise  barriers  which  sound 
policy  has  heretofore  raised  up  against  popular  and  party 
license.  A  federal  union  rests  on  a  broad  basis  of  states 
or  provinces  and  the  political  conditions  of  every  state  or 
province  must  more  or  less,  sooner  or  later,  influence  those 
of  the  federation  or  dominion  to  which  those  states  and 
provinces  give  life  and  union.  Once  adopt  the  elective 
principle  generally  in  the  provinces,  it  is  obvious  the  con- 
sequences would  be  most  serious  to  the  Dominion.  The 
result  would  be  that  Canada  would  be  no  longer  English  as 
respects  a  fundamental  principle  of  government.  She  would 
become  Americanized  by  the  adoption,  not  of  those  features 
of  the  system  of  her  neighbors  w^hich  might  give  her  addi- 
tional strength  and  unity,  but  rather  of  those  methods  which 
would  be  more  or  less  destructive  of  political  morality  and 
in  direct  antagonism  to  those  principles  of  sound  and  efficient 
government  which  true  Canadians  are  ambitious  to  see  gather 
force  while  they  are  laboring  to  establish  on  durable  founda- 
tions a  new  nationality  on  this  continent. 

House  0/ Commons,  Ottawa,  Canada.  J.  G.  BOURINOT. 

representative,  and  who  were  appointed  until  the  spoils  system  had  become  estab- 
lished, is  indefensible  upon  any  sound  principles.  The  changes  that  made  theia 
elective  were  naturally  desired  by  all  those  interested  in  the  patronage  of  party 
chieftains  or  gains  of  primary  elections.  To  make  the  re-appointment  of  such 
oflScers  safe  and  satisfactory,  we  must  reform  the  civil  service.  To  relieve  the 
primary  system  of  the  demoralizing  duty  of  selecting  officers  in  no  sense  rep- 
resentative, and  only  ministerial  and  administrative,  we  must  make  such  ofl&cers 
again  appointive."  D.  B.  Eaton  in  "Cyclopaedia  of  Political  Science,"  Art. 
"Primary  Elections." 

[683] 


THE  AMERICAN  ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  AND 

SOCIAL   SCIENCE. 

The  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science 
was  formed  in  Philadelphia,  December  14,  1889,  for  the 
purpose  of  promoting  the  Political  and  Social  Sciences. 

While  it  does  not  exclude  any  portion  of  the  field  indi- 
cated in  its  title,  yet  its  chief  object  is  the  development  of 
those  aspects  of  the  Political  and  Social  Sciences  which 
are  either  entirely  omitted  from  the  programmes  of  other 
societies,  or  which  do  not  at  present  receive  the  attention 
they  deserve. 

Among   such  subjects    may  be  mentioned:    Sociology , 
Comparative  Constitutional  and  Administrative  Law,  Phi- 
losophy of  the  State,  and  such  portions  of  the  field  of  Poll 
tics,  including  Finance  and  Banking,  as  are  not  adequately 
cultivated  by  existing  organizations. 

A  special  effort  will  be  made  to  collect  and  publish  mate- 
rial which  will  be  of  use  to  students,  and  which  does  not 
now  reach  the  public  in  any  systematic  way,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, the  texts  in  English  of  the  Constitutions  of  leading 
foreign  countries;  regular  accounts  of  current  instruction 
in  Political  and  Social  topics  at  home  and  abroad  ;  descrip- 
tive bibliographies  ;  discussions  of  Municipal  Government,  eta 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Academy  thus  supplements  the 
efforts  of  existing  societies  of  similar  aims,  and  sub- 
stantially strengthens  their  work  by  contributing  its  share 
to  beget  a  deeper  and  more  widespread  interest  in  the  gene 
ral  subject  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 

The  plan  of  the  Academy  includes  regular  scientific  meet- 
ings for  the  presentation  of  papers    and  communications, 
establishment  of  a  library,  and  the  dissemination  of  knowl 
edge  on  Political  and  Social  topics  through  its  publications 
and  by  such  other  means  as  may  seem  suitable. 

During  the  winter,  regular  monthly  meetings  have  bee» 
held  since  the  Academy  was  formed  at  which  the  papen 
submitted  have  been  read  and  discussed. 


■^ 


*^€aiTj  CTH  the  work  of  tlie  Academy  satisfactorily,  large 
limds  are  t^ccessary.  The  mcome  of  the  Academy  at  present 
fa  denved  from  the  Animal  Membership  Fee,  which  is  ,^5,00; 
Jie  Lite  Membership  Fee,  which  is  $ioo ;  and  from  tlie  contri- 
bntions  of  those  who  may  be  ^viilitig  to  assist  in  its  work  It 
is  desired  to  secure  the  establishment  of  prizes  and  fellowships. 

Anyone  may  become  a  member  on  being  approved  by 
the  Couticil  and  pa>'ing  the  Annual  or  Life  Membership  Fee 
Members  are  entitled  to  receive  the  regular  publications  of 
the  Academy,  submit  papers  and  communications,  and  to 
attend  and  take  part  in  all  scientific  meetings.  Life  mem- 
bers are  exempt  from  all  annual  fees. 

The  hst  of  members  now  includes  the  names  of  nearly  all 
the  prominent  thinkers  and  writers  on  Political,  Economic 
and  Social  topics  in  the  United  States  and  Canada,  and  many 
in  Europe. 

The  co-operation  of  all  persons  interested  in  the  scientific  in- 
vestigation of  Political  and  Social  affairs  is  earnestly  soHcited 

The  proceedings  of  the  Academy  are  published  in  the 
form  of  a  periodical  called  the  Annals  of  the  Americaic 
Academy  op  Pouticai.  anb  Sociai."  ScmNCK,  which 
together  with  such  other  matter  as  may  be  published  for 
that  purpose,  is  sent  to  aU  members  of  the  Academy  free 
of  charge.  A  copy  of  the  current  number  of  the  Annai^ 
will  be  sent  to  anyone  for  examination. 

Papers  and  communications  wMch  the  writers  wish  to 
submit  to  the  Academy  with  a  view  to  their  being  read  in  a 
Scientific  vSession  and  subsequently  published  in  the  Proceed- 
ings,  as  well  as  applications  for  membership,  should  be  seat 
to  the  following  address : 

AmericaD  Academy  of  Political  aod  Social  Scieac^ 

STATION  B.  PHILADELPHIA.  PA. 

N.  B.— Fees  and  contributions  may  be  remitted  by  postal 
<xder  on  Philadelphia,  or  by  draft  oo  New  York,  drawn  to  . 

Stieet,  Philadelphia. 


■ft 


*  Jie  -txmerieaG  Auadernv 


ow 


Political  and  Social  Science 


PHII^DELPHIA. 


HBNRY  C.  LEi, 

200O  Walnut  8tr«;et 


Pftsident, 
HPMUND  J.  JAMES,  Ph.  D..  T7niver?ity  of  Pennsylvania. 


Corresponding  Sec'y, 
R.  P  FAI.KNHR,  Ph.  D.. 
Germantowa,  Phlla. 


Secretariei. 


STUART  WOOD, 
400  Cbeuni?t  Street. 


Pbof.  F.  H.  GIBDINGS,  A.  M., 
Columbia  College. 

Pnording  Secy, 
C.  R   WOODRUFF, 

514  Walnu*.  Street. 

**^»»»^  ^J^I  "       — '.-«'^^,  Libfarian, 

JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS,  Ph.  D.,         JOHN  L  STEWART 

3705 1/)cust  Street.  Manual  Training  School. 


General  Secretary, 


GENERAL  ADVISORY  COMMITTEE. 


BR.  C.  K.  ADAMS, 

President  of  Wisconsin  University. 
PROF.  C.  F.  BASTABI,F„ 

Dublin  University. 
PROF.  F.  W.  BI.ACKMAR. 

T7mvers:tv  of  Kansas. 

J,  G.  BCTJTliNOT.  C.M.G.,  Ph.I>.,  B.C.I.., 

Ottawa,  Canada. 
PROF.  J.  W.  BTTRGI5SS, 

Colutnbia  College. 
HON.  THOMAS  M.  COOtKY 

Anil  Arbor,  Mich. 
PROF.  R,  T.  J?I,Y, 

Wiscourfin  University. 
PROF.  HKNRY  W    FARNAM. 

\  ale  University. 
PROF.  W.  W.  FOJUWFXI,. 

University  of  Minnesota. 
HON.  1.YMAN  J.  GAGB. 

Chicago,  111. 

PROF.  JOHN  K.  INGRAM.  I,t,.D.. 

Tnnity  College,  Dublin. 
PROF.  T.  w.  TENKS. 

Coraell  TJaiversity. 

^^''  ■^^ii'RpSTONjrOHNSTON, 

President  of  1*iilaae  University. 


RIGHT  REV  JOHN  J    KEANF,  D.D., 
Catholic  Univerf^ity  of  America. 

PROF.  BI^RNARD  MOSFS, 

University  of  Caliiomta. 

^^^^  hB'  NICHOLSON,  M.  A., 
Edinburgh  University. 

DR.  HENRY  WADF  ROGERS, 

President  Northwestern  Uriversftv 
PROF.  HENR  Y  SIDGWICK, 

Cambridge  TJniversity. 
PROF,  Wirj,iAM  SMART, 

Queen  Margaret  College,  Gla^ow. 
SIMON  STERNE  Esq., 

New  k  ork  City.  ' 

HON  HANNIS  TAyIoR,  hU  a. 
Madrid,  Spain. 

PROF.  J.  B.  THAYER, 

•      Harvard  Law  ScJiooL 
PROF.  F.  N.  THORPE, 

University  of  .Penn.^:vama 
DR,  FR.1NCTS  A.  WALEER. 

Pres.  Ma.ss.  Institute  of  Technoioey. 

I^ESTER  F.WARD.  Esq.,  ' 

Washington,  D,  C. 

PROF   WOODROW  W^fXSON. 
Princetoii  University. 


ii    «i 


